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Lender Liability Under CERCLA:
Death of the EPA Rule and
Resurrection of Uncertainty
STEPHEN D. STOLTZ*
You can imagine the scenario. Improvident Bank of Any-
town, U.S.A. (Improvident) makes a $50,000 loan to Billy A. Da-
vis d/b/a Local Underwear Company (BADLUC) to enable
BADLUC to upgrade its equipment and modernize its production
process. Although some risks clearly existed in making the loan,
Improvident's due diligence investigation uncovered no significant
problems and, besides, Davis had been a good customer of the
bank for many years. As part of the consideration for the loan,
Improvident takes a security interest in BADLUC's accounts, in-
ventory, and other personal and real property.
BADLUC's business booms for a few years. Then suddenly
the bottom falls out of the underwear market. An influx of cheap
apparel from abroad sharply reduces the demand for BADLUC's
high quality (but high priced) wares. Soon, BADLUC is unable to
make regular loan payments. Improvident and BADLUC attempt
various work out plans, but to no avail. BADLUC ultimately files
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Immediately afterwards, Im-
provident moves to foreclose and take possession of BADLUC's
property in an effort to satisfy the balance of the loan. Upon tak-
ing title to the property, however, Improvident discovers several
partially buried drums in the lot behind the main plant. State and
federal investigators are called to the scene. They quickly deter-
mine that the drums and surrounding soil contain high levels of
unknown but obviously noxious chemicals. The EPA orders clean-
up crews to remove the drums and toxic soil and to install moni-
toring wells. Months later, Improvident gets a curt letter from the
EPA: "Pursuant to . . . you owe us $5 million plus . . . ." Will
* Senior staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW;
J.D., Class of 1994, University of Kentucky; B.A., 1987, Transylvania University.
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Improvident be responsible for the payment of an amount one
hundred times larger than its initial loan?
The answer, of course, depends upon the circumstances. This
note will explore those circumstances in the context of a specific
source of lender liability found in the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or the
"Act"). 1 The analysis begins with a general description of CER-
CLA and, in particular, the uncertain contours of the security in-
terest exemption under which many lenders endeavor to find ref-
uge. Next, the judicial gloss which several court cases have placed
on the exemption will be explored in an attempt to clarify its key
elements. This note will then examine the EPA's recently promul-
gated regulation designed to further refine the law, and the corre-
sponding judicial response to this effort. Finally, recommendations
will be made for legislative action with regard to this CERCLA
exemption.
I. CERCLA AND THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION FOR LENDERS
CERCLA is a comprehensive federal statutory regime
designed to enhance the government's authority in promptly re-
sponding to and seeking reimbursement for the costs of cleaning
up a release2 of one or more hazardous substances' into the envi-
ronment. Four broad classes of persons4 are potentially responsible
under the Act for such costs, in an action either by the govern-
ment or by private parties seeking contribution." Section 107(a) of
CERCLA imposes liability on: (1) current owners or operators;
(2) prior owners or operators; (3) generators; and (4) transport-
ers." The liability which attaches to these persons is widely re-
I Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
' The statute defines "release" broadly as virtually any kind of leak or emission of
hazardous substances into the environment, subject to a few exceptions. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(22).
3 The list of "hazardous substances" is exceedingly lengthy. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14); Designation of Hazardous Substances, 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1992).
' "The term 'person' means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership,
consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipal-
ity, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C:
§ 9601(21).
1 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041-42 (2d Cir. 1985) (action by
state against private parties).
' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Those liable under the statute include specifically:
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garded as strict7 and, where the harm is not divisible, joint and
several." Moreover, CERCLA provides a 9607(a) defendant with
few defenses with which to combat this potentially staggering
liability.9
The term "owner or operator" is defined in the statute in sev-
eral different ways, depending upon the kind of property which is
(I) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility
at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by
contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or ar-
ranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazard-
ous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and (4) any person
who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal
or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incur-
rence of response costs, of a hazardous substance
Id
Rather than expressly providing for a strict liability standard, Congress instead
chose to reference the standard under § 311 of the Clean Water Act in 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(32). Nevertheless, most courts believe Congress intended to impose
strict liability. See, e.g., Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d
1568. 1572 (holding current owners strictly liable); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 (hold-
ing corporate owner and its shareholder and officer strictly liable). One commentator ar-
gues that courts often impose liability inconsistently and in ways contrary to CERCLA's
statutory design; he suggests that courts more closely examine the purposes and policies
underlying the statute when deciding questions of liability. Michael P. Healy, Direct Lia-
bility for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach,
42 CASE W REs. L REV 65 (1992).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988) (mandating
joint and several liability where the parties fail to establish a reasonable basis for appor-
tioning liability), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,
572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ("[W]here two or more persons cause a single and
indivisible harm, each is subject to liability for the entire harm.") (citations omitted).
' Liability under § 107(a) is "subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b)
of this section [107(b)]." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Section 107(b) enumerates only three nar-
row defenses to CERCLA liability. Where the acts or omissions that led to the hazardous
substance release and accompanying damage are caused solely by "(I) an act of God, (2)
an act of war," or (3) an unrelated third party, or some combination thereof, the defendant
has a defense from liability. 42 U.S.C § 9607(b), There appear to be no cases in which a
defendant has attempted to assert an "act of war" defense to liability, and the "act of
God' defense has rarely succeeded. See, e.g., Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310,
316-17 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding defendant not responsible for a spill caused by lighting
striking a chemical warehouse). For a statutory definition of "act of God," see 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(l). The statute does not define "act of war." In reality, the third party defense of
107(b)(3) is the only statutory defense typically available to 107(a) defendants. See Eliza-
beth A. Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses Left?, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L,
REV. 385 (1988) (discussing nonstatutory defenses to CERCLA).
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the subject matter of the CERCLA claim.10 Significant here, the
statute also carves out a broad exemption for lenders and other
secured creditors by providing that "a person, who, without partic-
ipating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or
facility," is not an "owner or operator" of contaminated property
subject to liability.1 In other words, so long as a lender does not
"participate in the management" of its borrower, it will not be
liable for costs and other damages incurred in cleaning up and
disposing of the borrower's contaminated property, where the
lender holds "indicia of ownership" in order "primarily to protect
its security interest" in such property.
1I. CASE LAW CONSTRUCTION OF THE SECURITY INTEREST
EXEMPTION
The statute does not provide any guidance about the meaning
of the security interest exemption's key phrases: "indicia of owner-
ship," "participating in management," and "primarily to protect a
security interest.""2 The legislative history of this provision is
"sparse."'" As a result, the job of interpreting the exemption ap-
An "owner or operator" is defined as
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by
demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facil-
ity, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any
facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclo-
sure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or
local government, any person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled
activities at such facility immediately beforehand.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
I ld. The Act defines a "facility" broadly as
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor
vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise
come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer
use or any vessel.
CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). A "vessel" is "every description of watercraft
or other artificial contrivance used or capable of being used, as a means of transportation
on water," CERCLA § 101(28), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(28).
" Id.
, See, e.g., United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D.
Md. 1986) ("[Slecion 107(a) . ..is not a model of statutory clarity."); Lender Liability
Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,345 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 300.1100-.1 105) ("The scant legislative history of the security interest exemption does
not shed much light on this issue [of actual participation in management]."). An examina-
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pears to rest with the courts. Several cases subsequent to CER-
CLA's enactment have attempted in various ways to define each
of these elements more precisely."' A discussion of this case his-
tory will help to clarify the scope of the lender liability exemption
and to expose some of the exemption's major shortcomings which
ultimately led the EPA to promulgate its Lender Liability Rule.' 5
A. In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc.
The first case to construe the security interest exemption was
a bankruptcy decision called In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc. 6 In a
Chapter 7 proceeding, the EPA applied for a section 506(c) 7 re-
imbursement by the bankruptcy estate of T.P. Long Chemical,
Inc., a company which ran a rubber recycling plant, to recover the
costs it incurred in the cleanup and removal of hazardous sub-
stances from the company's rubber recycling plant.'" The judge
found the bankruptcy estate to be an "owner or operator" and
therefore liable under CERCLA. 19
One issue concerned whether the EPA was entitled to reim-
bursement out of the proceeds paid to a secured creditor,
BancOhio, from a sale of its collateral because the estate's unen-
tion of this "sparse" history reveals that the exemption was drafted in order to address the
problem that would exist in those states which adhered to the common law title theory (as
opposed to the lien theory) whereby the granting of a mortgage conveys actual title to the
mortgagee. See H R REP No 172, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 36 (1979), reprinted in
2 SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS.. A LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY
ACT OF 1980 546 (Comm. Print 1983). A lender in those states could incur CERCLA
liability for doing nothing more than accepting a mortgage. H.R. REP. No. 172. The effect
of the exemption, therefore, was to immunize a class of lenders from liability to the same
extent as their counterparts in lien theory states.
'" See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1555-56 (11th Cir. 1990),
reh'g denied, 911 F.2d 742 (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); Guidice v. BFG
Electroplating & Mfg. Co., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989); United States v.
Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. 573;
United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re
T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1985); see also infra notes 16-75 and
accompanying text.
"' Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992); see also infra
notes 82-111 and accompanying text.
" 45 B.R. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
17 Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, I I U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A), allows as an
administrative expense the actual costs of preserving an estate. Id. at 282. EPA argued
that its remediation costs should be reimbursed as administrative expenses. Id. at 282.
T.P. Long Chem., 45 B.R. at 279-81.
'g Id. at 284.
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cumbered assets were insufficient to cover the cleanup costs.20 In
support of its position, the EPA argued that BancOhio, which held
a security interest in the company's personal property, would be-
come liable as an owner or operator if it had attempted to repos-
sess and sell that portion of its collateral which was the cause of
the hazardous substance pollution.21 The judge rejected the EPA's
argument, citing the security interest exemption as authority. 2
The court held that even if BancOhio had repossessed the collat-
eral under the terms of the security agreement, CERCLA liability
would not be triggered because BancOhio would not have held in-
dicia of ownership for a purpose other than primarily to protect its
security interest.2" Since BancOhio also had not participated in
the management of the plant, it was held not liable as an owner or
operator.24
In the bankruptcy judge's view, merely holding a security in-
terest in contaminated property does not give rise to CERCLA
liability as an owner or operator. A secured party which repos-
sesses and takes title to its collateral does so primarily to protect
its security interest and, based upon the language of the statute,
should not thereby lose the exemption's protection. Some other
conduct is clearly required in order for a secured party to fall
outside the exemption.
B. United States v. Mirabile
United States v. Mirabile25 was the first case in which an
Article III court was called upon to construe the security interest
exemption. In Mirabile the federal government had initiated an
action to recover its costs in removing hazardous waste from real
property owned by Anna and Thomas Mirabile on which a paint
manufacturing business operated by Turco Coatings, Inc.
("Turco") was located. 26 Several third party defendants moved for
summary judgment, among them, American Bank and Trust
Company ("American") and Mellon Bank (East) National Asso-
ciation ("Mellon") which had provided financing to Turco. The
20 Id.
21 Id. at 288.
11 See supra note 14.
22 Id. at 288-89.
24 Id.
"1 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
16 Id. at 20,994-20,995.
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Mirabiles alleged that American and Mellon became liable as
owners or operators, in addition to Turco, because of their active
involvement with the debtor. In response, American and Mellon
did not dispute the Mirabiles' factual contentions, but they argued
that as a matter of law the financial control they exercised over
Turco was not enough to void the application of the security inter-
est exemption to their case.
American's potential liability stemmed from its 1981 foreclo-
sure and high bid at the sheriff's sale of the property. Four months
after the sale, American assigned its bid to the Mirabiles who ac-
cepted the sheriff's deed.2 7 Prior to assigning the bid, however,
American had inquired into the cost of removing drums stored on
the property, secured some buildings against vandalism, and
showed the property to prospective purchasers.28 It argued that
foreclosure only transferred equitable and not legal title to it;
therefore, it was not an "owner" under the meaning of the stat-
ute.29 Furthermore, the minimal level of management activity and
the foreclosure were actions consistent with protecting its security
interest, and so it should fall within the exemption.3" The court
agreed and sustained American's summary judgment motion."'
"[B]efore a secured creditor such as [American] may be held lia-
ble, it must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day opera-
tional aspects of the site."
32
The court contrasted American's permissible activities
against those undertaken by the other secured creditor, Mellon.
Two of Mellon's loan officers served on an advisory board estab-
lished by Turco to manage the facility on a day-to-day basis while
in bankruptcy.33 Although the evidence was conflicting (and
therefore precluded summary judgment in Mellon's favor), one
loan officer was alleged to have visited the plant on a frequent,
perhaps daily, basis and made significant manufacturing and plant
personnel decisions.34 The court reasoned that such activity, if
proven, would require a finding of liability. In contrast, mere
27 Id. at 20,996.
28 Id.
29 Id.; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
80 Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
, Id. at 20,997.
Id. at 20,996.
I ld. at 20,997.
34 Id.
1993-94]
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"participation in purely financial aspects of operation" would not
result in a loss of the exemption."
The Mirabile Court thus concluded that the security interest
exemption would not automatically be lost by a foreclosure on
contaminated property. Foreclosure to protect a security interest is
a permissible activity under the security interest exemption. More-
over, it distinguished creditors who participated in the actual, day-
to-day operations of a facility from those involved with its finan-
cial management. The capability to influence financial decisions of
a company, which could indirectly affect its waste disposal prac-
tices, is not enough to void the security interest exemption under
Mirabile.
C. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.
Another prominent case, United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co.,38 takes a different view with regard to a creditor's abil-
ity to foreclose on property while still receiving the protection of
the security interest exemption. As security for a loan, Maryland
Bank took a mortgage on farm property which subsequently be-
came the location for a garbage business.37 When the debtors de-
faulted on the loan, the bank proceeded to foreclose and purchase
the property at the resulting sale."8 The next year the EPA initi-
ated a removal action at the site and later sued the bank as record
owner of the property for over $550,000 in cleanup costs. 9
The court rejected Maryland Bank's claim that it should be
afforded the protection of the security interest exemption." The
court held that the bank lost the exemption and became liable
under CERCLA when it foreclosed and took title to the contami-
nated property of a defaulting borrower."1 In essence, when the
bank took title pursuant to the foreclosure sale it simply become a
section 107(a)(l) 4 2 current owner and no longer held a security
interest; the exemption was effective only during the life of the
" Id. at 20,996.
632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
I d. at 575.
38 Id.
39 Id.
, Id. at 579.
I Id.




mortgage."' The court also voiced a policy concern that the bank
would otherwise receive an unjust windfall from the government's
cleanup efforts if it were allowed to sell the property without hav-
ing to share the costs of remediation."
The Maryland Bank court dismissed as dicta the holding of
Long Chemical and rejected the rule of Mirabile." Nevertheless,
one can distinguish Maryland Bank's foreclosure conduct from
that in Mirabile and reconcile the two district court cases. In
Mirabile, American never took legal title to the property; it only
assigned its superior bid to the Mirabiles who themselves took ti-
tle. In Maryland Bank, however, the bank actually took title to
the property, became the legal owner, and continued as such until
the time the EPA commenced the action. By taking title, the Ma-
ryland Bank Court reasoned, a bank's security interest terminates
and with it goes the protection of the exemption.
The [security interest] exemption . . . covers only those persons
who, at the time of the clean-up, hold indicia of ownership to
protect a then-held security interest in the land. The verb tense
of the exclusionary language is critical. The security interest
must exist at the time of the clean-up. The mortgage held by
MB&T (the security interest) terminated at the foreclosure sale
of May 15, 1982, at which time it ripened into full title.4
The Maryland Bank court never considered the degree of
bank involvement in the management of the facility's operations.
Under its holding, it did not need to do so. Although the court
acknowledged that the bank had held the property for an ex-
tended period of time-nearly four years-before reselling it
(whereas American held the bid for its property only four
months), the court did not indicate whether it would have reached
a different result had the property been resold immediately or
promptly after the foreclosure sale.47 Read broadly, Maryland
" Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
" Id. at 580 ("In essence, the defendant's position would convert CERCLA into an
insurance scheme for financial institutions, protecting them against possible losses due to
the security of loans with polluted properties.").
I ld.
I d. at 579 (emphasis added) (quoting 55 AM JuR. 2D Mortgages § 785 (1975)).
47
Because MB & T has held the property for such an extended period of time,
this Court need not consider the issue of whether a secured party which pur-
chased the property at a foreclosure sale and then promptly resold it would
be precluded from asserting the [security interest] exemption. The United
1993-94)
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Bank leaves open the question of whether a bank could ever pro-
tect its security interest through foreclosure without risking sub-
stantial CERCLA liability.
D. United States v. Nicolet, Inc.
In United States v. Nicolet, Inc.,48 another action from the
Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania,40 the government sought
recovery of at least S2.5 million in abatement costs associated
with a "16 acre 'mountain' " of asbestos material located next to a
manufacturing facility in Ambler, Pennsylvania. 0 Nicolet, Inc.
purchased the site in 1962 from a British company, Turner and
Newall ("T & N"), which had acquired the facility during the
1930s through stock purchases of the original company, Keas-
bey.51 The primary issue here was to what extent must a mortga-
gee participate in the management of a facility to be liable as an
owner or operator under CERCLA.
The EPA claimed that T & N was liable under CERCLA as
an "owner or operator" because, among other things, it held a
mortgage while it was a substantial participant in the manage-
ment of the facility during the period of improper asbestos dispo-
sal.52 In denying T & N's motion to dismiss (which it treated as a
summary judgment motion), the court held that under Pennsylva-
nia law the mortgage could be considered "indicia of ownership,"
hence T & N's CERCLA liability depended solely upon the level
of its participation in managing the facility." The court further
held that the government had stated a claim against T & N and
adopted a standard of management participation consistent with
that articulated in Mirabile: "[E]xisting case law suggests that a
mortgagee can be held liable under CERCLA only if the mortga-
gee participated in the managerial and operational aspects of the
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently held
that a former mortgagee that purchased the property at foreclosure sale and
assigned it four months later was exempt from liability. United States v.
Mirabile.
Id. at 579 n.5.
712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
'o Mirabile also originated from this court. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying
text.
80 Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1196.
51 Id.
02 Id.
63 Id. at 1204.
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facility in question." 4 In sum, under both Mirabile and Nicolet,
actual involvement with facility operations, as opposed to merely
influencing financial decisions, is required to lose the security in-
terest exemption.
E. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Co., Inc.
Like Maryland Bank, Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and
Manufacturing Company, Inc." says a mortgagee is liable as an
owner or operator because of its foreclosure and subsequent
purchase of contaminated collateral. Berlin Metal Polishers
("Berlin") had established a line of credit and installment loans
with The National Bank of the Commonwealth ("National
Bank").56 Upon Berlin's default on its loan obligations, National
Bank officials assisted Berlin in obtaining a government loan and
provided other financial advice.57 The court held these activities
insufficient to void the security interest exemption because they
did not involve operational or waste disposal aspects of Berlin's
business.58
The situation changed, however, when National Bank took ti-
tle. Following its purchase of the property, National Bank in-
curred liability as an owner of the property. 9 The court identified
the division in the case law, as represented by Mirabile and Mary-
land Bank, regarding the question of whether the lender's
purchase of contaminated collateral at a foreclosure sale automat-
ically voids the security interest exemption. For two reasons the
court decided to adopt the strict Maryland Bank approach, which
holds that when a mortgagee becomes an owner it loses its secur-
ity interest (and its exemption) notwithstanding the duration of its
ownership. 60 First, the "policies underlying CERCLA" do not per-
mit banks to reap the benefits of the cleanup at government ex-
pense.1 Second, the fact that when Congress adopted the SARA
14 Id. at 1205.
" 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
5 Id. at 558.
" Id. at 562.
" Id.
59 Id. at 563.
60 Id.
" The Maryland Bank court stated that the Congressional intent of the exemption,
based upon an early House report, was to protect lenders in those states governed by the
common law of mortgages (under which mortgagees are considered to hold legal as well as
equitable title to the collateral) and not all mortgagees who subsequently acquire title by,
1993-941
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amendments 2 to CERCLA it failed to amend the statute to spe-
cifically exclude from the definition of "owner or operator" those
lenders who acquire through foreclosure and that evinced an in-
tent to hold such lenders liable.6 "
Guidice joins Maryland Bank in adopting the strict foreclo-
sure rule. This position stands in sharp contrast to that taken by
Mirabile and Long Chemical, which requires some other signifi-
cant conduct, i.e., actual participation in the management of a fa-
cility, in addition to foreclosure before CERCLA liability will be
imposed on the holder of a security interest. While divided along
that line, the courts in 1989 at least appeared to be in agreement
about the other contentious element, what level of "participation
in management" the bank or lender could not exceed before losing
the exemption. Such agreement would not be long enjoyed.
F. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.
Given the development of prior case law, many were sur-
prised at the outcome of United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,64 in
which the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals essentially rejected
the actual management participation approach adopted by
Mirabile and Nicolet (and also Long Chemical) in favor of a
much broader test of "participation in management," which sig-
nificantly curtails the scope of protection afforded by the security
interest exemption. The defendant in the case, Fleet Factors Cor-
poration ("Fleet"), had entered into a standard "factoring" ar-
rangement under which, in exchange for providing financing to a
Georgia cloth printing facility called Swainsboro Print Works
(SPW), it took an assignment of SPW's accounts receivable and a
security interest in SPW's facility, inventory, equipment, and fix-
tures. 6 Three years later, SPW filed for bankruptcy protection
for example, foreclosure. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573,
579 (D. Md. 1986); see also supra note 13.
2 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 101
Stat. 1613 (1986)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988)).
"3 Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 579; see also Roslyn Tom, Interpreting the Mean-
ing of Lender Management Participation Under Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE
L.I. 925, 926 (1989).
6- 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990), rehg denied, 911 F.2d 742 (en banc), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
66 Id. at 1552.
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under Chapter 11, which proceeding was converted to a Chapter 7
two years later."
While SPW was liquidating its assets, Fleet continued to col-
lect accounts receivable under the factoring agreement. 7 About
five years after its arrangement with SPW had begun, Fleet fore-
closed on the inventory and equipment and arranged with Baldwin
Industrial Liquidators ("Baldwin") to auction off the remaining
property. Baldwin sold part of the property and directed Nix
Roger ("Nix") to remove the remainder using, in Nix's words,
"whatever means necessary."6 8 Fleet never took title to the real
property, and the county government eventually became record
owner following a tax foreclosure sale. One month after Nix aban-
doned the facility, the EPA discovered and subsequently initiated
a cleanup of seven hundred drums of toxic chemicals and forty-
four truckloads of asbestos-laden material. 6 The EPA then sued
Fleet, among others, as a former owner or operator of the facil-
ity70 to recover nearly $400,000 in remediation costs.
The case before the court of appeals was postured as an inter-
locutory appeal of the order denying Fleet's motion for summary
judgment. As such, the court observed that it was bound to view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the government and, fur-
ther, that Fleet had the burden of proving it qualified for the se-
curity interest exemption. 7 1 In analyzing Fleet's potential operator
liability, the court examined Fleet's activities during three sepa-
rate time periods: (I) Phase I, beginning in 1976 when the parties
entered into the factoring agreement until the conversion of
SPW's bankruptcy into a Chapter 7 in February, 1981; (2) Phase
II, an approximately one-year period covering SPW's cessation of
operations, Fleet's foreclosure on the inventory and equipment,
and Fleet's contracting with Baldwin to sell the remaining prop-
erty; and (3) Phase III, from May 1982, the time of the Baldwin
contract, to the present (including the time of the EPA cleanup).7 2
In explaining its construction of the exemption's management
participation element, the court specifically rejected the Mirabilel
as Id.
07 Id.
68 Id. at 1552-53.
09 Id. at 1553.
70 See CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1553.
72 Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555-57, 1560.
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Nicolet distinction, which the district court below had relied upon
in finding Fleet potentially liable only for its activities during
Phase III, between permissible involvement in financial decision
making and impermissible involvement in day-to-day operations.73
The appellate court concluded that because of CERCLA's "over-
whelmingly remedial" purpose and the "plain language of the ex-
emption," a narrower reading of the security interest exemption
was required. 7' The court thereafter articulated a new test, which
many now regard as dicta, 75 for the level of participation in man-
agement of a facility in the security interest exemption:
Under the standard we adopt today, a secured creditor may in-
cur section 9607(a)(2) liability, without being an [actual] opera-
tor, by participating in the financial management of a facility to
a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's
treatment of hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the se-
cured creditor actually to involve itself in the day-to-day opera-
tions of the facility in order to be liable-although such conduct
will certainly lead to the loss of the protection of the statutory
exemption. Nor is it necessary for the secured creditor to par-
ticipate in management decisions relating to hazardous waste.
Rather, a secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with
the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support
the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal deci-
sions if it so chose. We, therefore, specifically reject the formu-
lation of the secured creditor exemption suggested by the district
court in Mirabile.
76
73 td. at 1556.
7, Id. at 1557.
" See, e.g., Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,345 (1992)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100) ("This uncertainty [in the law] was heightened
by dicta in the [Fleet Factors] opinion."); David R. Berz & Peter M. Gillon, Lender Lia-
bility Under CERCLA: In Search of a New Deep Pocket, 108 BANKING L.J. 4, 5-6 (1991)
(noting Fleet was "roundly condemned by the financial community"); Michael L. Green-
berg & David M. Shaw, Note, To Lend or Not to Lend. That Should Not be the Question:
The Uncertainties of Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 41 DUKE L.J. 1211, 1232 (1992)
("[T]he Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the exemption has received substantial criti-
cism."); Bruce P. Howard & Melissa K. Gerard, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Sort-
ing Out the Mixed Signals, 64 S CAL. L REV. 1187, 1199 (1991) (arguing that the "court
did not need to fashion an overbroad liability standard to hold the lender liable"); Sean P.
Madden, Comment, Will the CERCLA be Unbroken? Repairing the Damage After Fleet
Factors, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 135, 148-49 (1990) ("The reaction to Fleet Factors was
swift and overwhelmingly negative." (footnote omitted)).




Applying this new test to the facts as alleged by the govern-
ment, the court held that Fleet failed to meet its burden of proof
and that material issues of fact existed as to whether it could be
held liable as an operator of the facility during Phase II and
Phase III. It affirmed the district court's denial of Fleet's sum-
mary judgment motion and remanded the case for trial.77 If
Fleet's involvement with SPW during Phase I were limited to ad-
vancing funds, paying utilities, and advising SPW of its credit
limits, then it would fall within the exemption.7 8 However, Phase
II and III saw Fleet's alleged involvement with SPW "substan-
tially increase":
Fleet required SPW to seek its approval before shipping its
goods to customers, established the price for excess inventory,
dictated when and to whom the finished goods should be
shipped, determined when employees should be laid off, super-
vised the activity of the office administrator at the site, received
and processed SPW's employment and tax forms, controlled ac-
cess to the facility, and contracted with Baldwin to dispose of
the fixtures and equipment at SPW. These facts, if proved, are
sufficient to remove Fleet from the protection of the secured
creditor exemption.
7 9
The court also rejected Fleet's contention that, although it
participated in the management of SPW during Phase III, it
should not be liable because it did so primarily to protect its se-
curity interest. The relevant inquiry, according to the Fleet Fac-
tors Court, "is the nature and extent of the creditor's involvement
with the facility, not its motive."90
Much has been written about the Fleet Factors decision and
the considerable concern it has caused financial institutions., The
result of Fleet Factors seems to be that a secured creditor in a
11 Id. at 1560.
8 -d at 1559.
I* d. (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 1560.
8 See, e.g., Brian W. Smith, Cleanup Law Hazardous to Banks With Deep Pockets,
AM. BANKER, July 18, 1990, at 4. But see Stephen Kleege, Lenders Doubt Report That
Belittles Cleanup Liability, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2, 1991, at 6 (noting that liability exposure
has been exaggerated); Brent Nicholson & Todd Zuiderhoek, The Lender Liability Di-
lemma: Fleet Factors History and Aftermath, 38 S. DAKOTA L. REv. 22, 39-43 (1993)
(observing that few of the nation's largest banks, including Fleet Norstar the parent corpo-
ration of Fleet Factors Corporation, appear to have made any substantive changes in their
lending policies since the Fleet Factors decision).
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position to potentially affect waste disposal decisions, even if it
does not actually participate in managing a facility, would have
difficulty qualifying for the security interest exemption. By failing
to elaborate on exactly what involvement was "sufficiently broad"
enough to trigger the "capacity to influence" standard of operator
liability, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals left many lenders
justifiably confused about the kinds of assistance, if any, they
could safely provide troubled borrowers.
II. THE EPA's ATTEMPT AT CLARIFICATION: THE LENDER
LIABILITY RULE
The uncertainty engendered by Fleet Factors led the EPA to
promulgate its own regulation interpreting the security interest ex-
emption (the "Lender Liability Rule" or "Final Rule")."9 A pro-
posed EPA rule"3 was published June 24, 1991, and after a public
comment period the Final Rule"4 was promulgated on April 29,
1992, to be effective immediately.s
A. Purpose of the Rule
The Lender Liability Rule attempts to resolve the uncertainty
about the security interest exemption in a light most favorable to
financial institutions. Its avowed purpose is to more clearly define
the three statutory elements of the security interest exemption so
as to "permit a person covered by the exemption to undertake a
broad range of activity in the course of protecting a security inter-
est in a facility that is subject to CERCLA, without being consid-
" Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992). There appear to
have been at least three prior drafts of the rule. Two were "leaked" to the public and not
published in the Federal Register. One came out in September, 1990. EPA Draft -Proposal
Defining Lender Liability Issues Under the Secured Creditor Exemption of CERCLA, 21
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1162 (Oct. 12, 1990). The other draft was released in Janu-
ary, 1991. Proposed Draft Rule on Lender Liability Under CERCLA With Accompanying
Letter From EPA to OMB, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1908 (Feb. 22, 1991). The
third draft was published in the Federal Register as a notice of proposed rule and request
for comment. Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798 (1991) (proposed
June 24, 1991). The last draft was published as the Final Rule. Lender Liability Under
CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100); see infra
notes 83-111 and accompanying text.
11 Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798 (1991) (proposed June 24,
1991).
s1 Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. § 300.1100).
11 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,374 (1992); 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(1) (1988).
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ered to be participating in the management of the facility."" The
EPA also sought to balance the holder's need to protect its secur-
ity interest with the EPA's mandate to clean up sites and recover
its costs from liable parties.8 7 The overall thrust appears to favor a
more liberal application of the exemption."' The summary to the
Final Rule, however, warns that the exemption should not be con-
strued as a loan guarantee or as insurance for lenders' poor loan
decisions. 8" It serves as a shield against liability for hazardous
waste cleanup only and not against the risks of and damages asso-
ciated with a reduction in the market value of property due to
unforeseen contamination.Y0
B. "Indicia of Ownership"
Under the Lender Liability Rule, evidence of an interest in
real or personal property, for purposes of the exemption, includes
nearly all types of collateral normally held by financial institu-
tions: mortgages, deeds of trust, legal or equitable title pursuant to
foreclosure and their equivalents, title held pursuant to lease fi-
nancing transactions, liens, surety bonds, guaranties of obliga-
tions, assignments, pledges, and other rights or forms of encum-
brance against property. 9' In order to protect loan guarantors and
sureties, the Final Rule additionally provides that a financial insti-
tution is not required to hold title or a security interest in order to
maintain indicia of ownership."2 Unsecured creditors, who hold no
indicia of ownership, remain unprotected by the exemption.9
The most significant change here is that the acquisition of
full title to property through foreclosure would clearly qualify for
the security interest exemption.94 This change appears to be the
EPA's answer to the question posed by Maryland Bank." As long
57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,346 (1992).
Id. at 18,347.
The textual evolution from the proposed version to the Final Rule reflect EPA's
intent to broaden the range of permissible activities and thus expand the class of lenders
entitled to the exemption. Compare 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798; 28,808-10 (1991) with 57 Fed.
Reg. 18,344, 18,382-85 (1992).
" 57 Fed. Reg. at 18,346; see also United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632
F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986).
90 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,346 (1992).
40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(a) (1992).
.2 Id.
57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,352 (1992).
See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d).
6 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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as foreclosure occurs primarily to protect a security interest, a fi-
nancial institution will not expose itself to CERCLA liability as
an owner or operator.
C. "Primarily to Protect a Security Interest"
Indicia of ownership must be "held primarily for the purpose
of securing payment or performance of an obligation."96 Indicia
held primarily for an investment or some other purpose will void
the exemption. A holder may certainly have other reasons for
holding indicia, including sound investment reasons, but the pri-
mary one must be for the protection of its security interest.97
In Maryland Bank, for example, the court implied that the
bank may have lost its exemption because, in addition to holding
"title" to the property rather than a mere "security interest," it
held title for four years-too long a period following foreclosure. 98
Since the bank failed to sell or even attempt to sell the property
promptly and apply the proceeds of such sale to the outstanding
loan balance, one could presume that it held the indicia of owner-
ship primarily as an investment and not primarily to safeguard its
security interest. This practice continues to be impermissible
under the Lender Liability Rule. Finally, the Rule recognizes that
security interests may arise from other financial transactions, pro-
vided their primary purpose is to secure a loan or other obligation,
including "sale and leasebacks, conditional sales, installment sales,
trust receipt transactions, certain assignments, factoring agree-
ments, accounts receivable financing arrangements, and
consignments." 99
D. "Participation in Management"
In direct response to the broad definition set forth in Fleet
Factors,0 0 the Lender Liability Rule defines management partici-
pation more narrowly as "actual participation in the management
or operational affairs of the vessel or facility by the holder, and
does not include the mere capacity to influence, or ability to influ-
40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(b)(emphasis added).
,' Id.
' See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
" 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(b)(I).
,oo See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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ence, or the unexercised right to control facility operations."' 0'
During the period that the borrower is in possession of the prop-
erty, a holder may be considered a participant in management
when it: (1) "exercises decisionmaking control over the borrower's
environmental compliance, such that the holder has undertaken
responsibility for the borrowers hazardous substance handling or
disposal practices;" or (2) exercises management control over the
borrower's enterprise to the extent that it controls the day-to-day
decisionmaking over either (a) environmental compliance or (b)
substantially all of the enterprise's operational aspects other than
environmental compliance." 2
The Lender Liability Rule lists several activities which are
specifically deemed not to constitute participating in manage-
ment.' °3 First, all pretransaction activities such as requiring or
conducting environmental inspections/audits, requiring a borrower
to clean up property, or requiring assurances of compliance with
environmental laws and regulations as conditions for a loan, will
not be construed as participating in management. 04 Second, many
ordinary loan work out activities,' 0 5 consistent with preserving a
security interest, are also expressly permissible:
Work out activities include, but are not limited to restructuring
or renegotiating the terms of a security interest; requiring pay-
ment of additional rent or interest; exercising forbearance; re-
quiring or exercising rights pursuant to an assignment of ac-
counts or other amounts owing to an obligor; requiring or
exercising rights pursuant to an escrow agreement pertaining to
amounts owing to an obligor; providing specific or general finan-
cial or other advice, suggestions, counseling, or guidance; and
exercising any right or remedy the holder is entitled to by law or
under any warranties, covenants, conditions, representations or
promises from the borrower. 10 6
Third, the Final Rule allows considerable flexibility regarding per-
missible foreclosure and liquidation activities. Legal or equitable
title held pursuant to "foreclosure and its equivalents" will not
invalidate the exemption, as long as such title is taken or held in
40 C.F.R. § 300.11 00(c)(1)-
102 Id.
102 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(2).
104 40 C.F.R. § 300.11 00(c)(2)(i).
10 40 C.FR. § 300.1 100(c)(2)(ii).
1- 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(c)(2)(ii)(B).
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order to protect primarily a security interest in the property.'
These are all permitted:
"[Floreclusure and its equivalents" include purchase at a fore-
closure sale; acquisition or assignment of title in lieu of foreclo-
sure; termination of a lease or other repossession; acquisition of
a right to title or possession; an agreement in satisfaction of the
obligation; or any other formal or informal manner ... by which
the holder acquires title to or possession of the secured
property. 108
While holding title pursuant to foreclosure, the holder may sell,
re-lease, liquidate, continue operations, wind up affairs, and do
whatever is commercially reasonable to preserve the value of
holder's security interest without losing the exemption.10 9
As a guide to secured creditors, the Lender Liability Rule
enumerates three specific examples of post-foreclosure conduct
which will likely be viewed as evidence that title is taken for a
reason other than primarily to preserve a security interest: (1)
failure within twelve months of foreclosure to list the property
with an appropriate broker or agent for sale and to advertise at
least monthly; and (2) outbidding, rejecting, or failing to act
within ninety days on a firm, written offer of fair consideration
(the amount of outstanding debt plus other liens and costs) made
six months following foreclosure." 0 Additionally, a holder contin-
ues to remain liable for improper disposal, treatment, or transpor-
tation of hazardous waste following foreclosure." 1 Provided it
avoids the latter three caveats, a lender may presumably hold title
to foreclosed property indefinitely without being subject to CER-
CLA liability as an owner or operator under the Lender Liability
Rule.
40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d).
108 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(I).
,09 Id.
40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1100(d)(2)(i), (ii).
11 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE AFTERMATH OF THE EPA'S LENDER LIABILITY RULE
A. Subsequent Case Law Treatment of the Security Interest
Exemption
Although the Lender Liability Rule was not expected to have
retroactive effect,"' soon after its promulgation several courts re-
lied on it as authority in deciding existing cases involving the con-
struction of the security interest exemption. Already five published
opinions have given it some weight in deciding whether a defend-
ant should be afforded the protection of the exemption."' Other
cases have cited the Final Rule and either ignored it or stated that
it does not apply to events occurring prior to its promulgation.""
The Lender Liability Rule does indeed clarify the meaning of
the exemption, but in doing so it essentially overrules Fleet Fac-
tors and Maryland Bank, two leading cases in this area. Despite
the Final Rule's rather abrupt break with the case law, no court
thus far has criticized the substance of the rule as contrary to the
language or purpose of the statute. Initially it appeared that
courts would be willing to defer to the EPA's interpretation of the
exemption in spite of contrary case law. 1
B. Kelley v. EPA: The Death of the Lender Liability Rule
The EPA issued the Lender Liability Rule as an amendment
to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contin-
gency Plan" 6 (the "Plan") and based its authority to issue the
"' 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,374 (1992).
'" See Northeast Doran, Inc. v. Key Bank of Maine, No. CIV. 92-0247-B, 1993 WL
313629 (D. Me. June 4, 1993), afftd, No. 93-1699, 1994 WL 13835 (1st Cir. Jan. 28,
1994); U.S. v. Fleet Factors Corp., 821 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 1993); U.S. v. Fleet Fac-
tors Corp., 819 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Ga. 1993); Kelley v. Tiscornia, 810 F. Supp. 901
(W.D. Mich. 1993); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Sonford Products Corp., 810 F. Supp. 1057 (D.
Minn. 1993).
.. See. e.g.. Northeast Doran, Inc. v. Key Bank of Maine, No. 93-1184, 1994 WL
13835, at *2 n.I (1st Cir. Jan. 28, 1994); U.S. v. McLamb, 5 F.3d 69, 73 (4th Cir. 1993).
"' One commentator concluded that under the standard set forth in Chevron U.S.A.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), courts should give the rule
deference. Peter N. Lavelette, The Security Interest Exemption Under CERCLA: Timely
Relief from the EPA, 24 TOLEDO L. REV 473, 499-504 (1993). Since Congress did not
speak directly to the issue, courts should accord deference to the EPA's reasonable inter-
pretation of the security interest exemption as stated in its Rule. Id. at 504.
"' See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1992). The President (and EPA by delegation) is author-
ized by CERCLA to develop a comprehensive national plan for identifying, evaluating and
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rule on, among others, sections 105,111 106,118 and 115119 of CER-
CLA.1a0 Section 113(a) of CERCLA provides a ninety-day right
of judicial review in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals of any
regulation promulgated under CERCLA.12' Two parties filed suit
challenging the EPA's authority to issue this rule. 22 These actions
were consolidated, and on February 4, 1994, a three-judge panel
issued a two-to-one decision, Kelley v. EPA, declaring the rule to
be invalid.'
2 3
As a preliminary matter, the Kelley court noted that the
EPA had attempted to get Congressional approval for its interpre-
tation of the exemption prior to instituting its rulemaking proceed-
ing. ' 2 Having failed to convince Congress of the need to amend
the statute, the EPA subsequently decided to issue the Lender Li-
ability Rule.
1 25
Following a discussion of EPA's responsibilities under the
CERCLA and the history of the security interest exemption, the
court in Kelley identified and rejected the three bases upon which
the EPA claimed authority to issue binding regulations clarifying
the scope of the exemption. First, the court held that notwith-
removing hazardous substances from contaminated facilities. See CERCLA § 105(a), 42
U.S.C. § 9605(a) (1988).
17 The statute provides that "the President [or EPA by delegation] may, from time to
time, revise and republish the . . . plan." See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a). This plan is also re-
ferred to as the "National Contingency Plan" or hereinafter as simply the "Plan."
" Congress gave the President (and EPA by delegation) authority to take immediate
action to prevent the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance which could
result in "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the
environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). Such actions arc called "abatement actions."
119 Congress authorized the President to delegate his responsibilities under CERCLA
to other federal agencies. See 42 U.S.C. § 9615. The President by executive order has
delegated many of these responsibilities to EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg.
2,923 (Jan. 23, 1987), reprinted as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 Fed. Reg.
54,757 (Oct. 18, 1991), in 42 U.S.C.A. § 9615 (West Supp. 1993). One such responsibility
is amending and revising the Plan. Exec. Order No. 12,580 at § l(b)(1). Read in light of
the President's delegation to EPA and other federal agencies, all CERCLA provisions
which grant the President authority also give authority to designated agencies.
57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,346 (1992).
' See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a).
'2' See Kelley v. EPA, No. 92-1312 (D.C. Cir. filed July 28, 1992); Chemical Mfrs.
Ass'n v. EPA, No. 92-1314 (D.C. Cir. filed July 28, 1992).
-23 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Kelley]. Mikva, Silberman, and Hen-
derson were the judges who served on the panel. Judge Silberman wrote the majority opin-
ion, and Chief Judge Mikva filed a separate dissenting opinion.
... See H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 1505 (1990).
"' See Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1104.
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standing the broad grant of authority given by section 105,126
which gives the EPA responsibility to develop and revise the Na-
tional Contingency Plan, and section 115,127 which grants the
President delegation powers, Congress did not evince an intent to
confer on the EPA any authority to issue regulations regarding
liability under section 107(a). 12 1 In the court's view, the EPA was
attempting to use the authority it had to issue regulations under
section 105 to promulgate regulations which were actually related
to section 107. The court also held inapplicable other specific au-
thorizing provisions within section 105.129 Second, the court re-
jected the EPA's reliance on provisions granting it enforcement
powers,' 1 stating that these powers essentially made the EPA an
environmental prosecutor. In keeping with this analogy, the court
explained that it is the judge, rather than the prosecutor, which
ultimately must decide questions of liability. 3 ' Third, the court
was not persuaded by the EPA's "strongest argument:" its reli-
ance on subsection 106(b)(2) 131 which seems to require the EPA
to resolve liability issues in reimbursement actions. In those cases,
the court noted, the EPA is merely acting in the capacity of a
party defendant. If a defendant in a CERCLA action appealed
the EPA's initial decision denying reimbursement, the district
court would not be required to give deference to or even consider
the EPA's view of liability.' Furthermore, although the EPA
may be required to make an initial determination of liability
under 106(b), that section does not empower the EPA to select
"I Section 105(a) mandates that "[w]ithin one hundred and eighty days after Decem-
ber 1I, 1980, the President [i.e. EPA] shall, after notice and opportunity for public com-
ments, revise and republish the national contingency plan . . . , to reflect and effectuate the
responsibilities and powers created by this chapter." CERCLA § 105(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
... See supra note 119.
.. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1105.
I2 d. at 1106.
'3 See, e.g., 42 U.SC. § 9607(a)(4)(A)(authorizing the government to recover
remediation costs from liable parties); 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (giving EPA authority to issue
orders).
. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1106.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b). This subsection gives parties the right to petition EPA for a
reimbursement of their costs incurred in cleaning up a hazardous waste site. Id In order to
succeed, the petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it is not
liable for its response costs and that its costs were reasonable, or that the EPA acted un-
lawfully in ordering it to clean up the site. Id. EPA must make the initial decision to
reimburse, and this decision can'be appealed to a district court within 30 days. Id.
' Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1107.
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the criteria it uses to make those decisions; such criteria are more
appropriately developed by the judiciary or by Congress.""
The EPA argued in the alternative that if the court found its
Lender Liability Rule not to be a binding "legislative" regulation,
it should give deference to it as an "interpretative" regulation,
3 a
nonbinding interpretation of an ambiguous statute by an agency
charged with that statute's enforcement. Recognizing that the dis-
tinction between legislative and interpretative rules is rather
opaque, the court nevertheless stated that the rule as drawn:
[B]ears little resemblance to what we have traditionally found to
be interpretative regulation. The EPA does not really define spe-
cific statutory terms, but rather takes off from those terms and
devises a comprehensive regulatory regimen to address the lia-
bility problems facing secured creditors. This extensive quasi-
legislative effort to implement the statute does not strike us as
merely a construction of statutory phrases.138
Moreover, without statutory authority, even an interpretative reg-
ulation is not entitled to deference by the court.1"7 The court,
therefore, granted the petition for review and vacated the regula-
tion, effectively invalidating the Lender Liability Rule. 8'
CONCLUSION
It is important to acknowledge that while Kelley attacks the
EPA's authority to promulgate the Lender Liability Rule, it does
not speak to the substance of the EPA's interpretation of the ex-
emption. The court did not say that the EPA's interpretation was
contrary to the statute or to the purposes underlying CERCLA.
To date, no court has done so. However, Kelley does leave the
Lender Liability Rule without binding effect and invites subse-
quent courts to ignore it. Thus, the uncertainty engendered by
Fleet Factors and Maryland Bank, which* the rule sought to ad-
dress, has once again been resurrected.
Congress could address the uncertainty in this area of lender
liability law in one of two ways. It could simply amend the statute
and empower the EPA to make regulations interpreting the secur-
,34 Id.
,a' See supra note 115.
136 Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1108.
137 Id.
1 Id. at 1109.
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ity interest exemption."' Such express authority would address
the principal problem with the Lender Liability Rule raised in
Kelley v. EPA."40 Unfortunately, it would also mean that the EPA
probably would have to initiate a new notice and comment pro-
ceeding and issue a new rule. This procedure would likely take
several more years and, thus, do little in the short term to resolve
the lingering issues identified above.
Alternatively, Congress itself could explain the meaning and
scope of the exemption. First, it could indicate in the statute
whether foreclosure upon contaminated property should automati-
cally result in liability or whether other conditions are necessary.
Second, it could clarify what it means by "participation in the
management" of a facility, whether it means day-to-day opera-
tional involvement or merely the "capacity to influence" under
Fleet Factors. Finally, Congress could address several gaps in the
statute which the rule leaves open: the extent of fiduciary liabil-
ity,"' liability of unsecured creditors," 2 and lender liability under
other law."'
Action by Congress could go a long way toward settling the
questions raised by the security interest exemption, the EPA's
Lender Liability Rule, and the related case law developments. In
the absence of further Congressional direction, lenders like Im-
provident in the introductory hypothetical would be wise to avoid
possible liability through the use of well-known pretransaction risk
avoidance techniques, such as due diligence investigations, site in-
spections, environmental audits, and, lastly, denial of credit.
Should a lender nonetheless find itself in Improvident's position, it
might try to conform its conduct to that prescribed in the Lender
139 Such an effort is currently underway. On February 7, 1994, Senators Baucus and
Lautenberg introduced President Clinton's bill to amend and reauthorize CERCLA, "The
Superfund Reform Act of 1994." See S. Res. 1834, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., 140 CONG_ REC.
1047-04 (1994). Among its numerous provisions, the bill proposes to give EPA express
authority to promulgate regulations concerning the limitations on lender liability. 1d. at
278.
140 See supra notes 116-136 and accompanying text.
141 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,349 (1992).
141 Id. at 18,344.
1,3 For example, similar concerns have been raised about the issue of lender liability
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1988)). See also 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344. 18,349
(1992).
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Liability Rule, which finds some recent case law support.144 How-
ever, the more prudent lender will strive to follow the mandate of
Fleet Factors and its progeny and hope that Congress comes to
the rescue soon!
' See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Their value has sharply declined be-
cause of Kelley.
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